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Executive summary 
Policy context 
This report summarises the research results of the STREST FP7 project and its impact on 
the application of stress tests for non-nuclear critical infrastructures (CIs). It answers to 
the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection and the Internal Security 
Strategy to develop guidelines for multi-hazard disaster management, aiming to improve 
the protection of European and national critical infrastructures and the resilience of 
society to natural and man-made disasters. Furthermore, STREST takes into account the 
requirements prescribed by the Directive for the reduction of the consequences of 
accidents involving dangerous substances. Improved effectiveness of systems for 
preventing, preparing for and responding to natural and man-made disasters is also the 
aim of the European Union Civil Protection Mechanism. At the global level, the 
substantial reduction of disaster damage to CIs and disruption of basic services is one of 
the seven targets of the Sendai Framework for disaster risk reduction. This makes the 
STREST project a key component to prepare for potential European Union policy changes 
in the areas of infrastructure, disaster risk reduction and societal resilience. 
 
Key conclusions 
Recent events have confirmed the potential for the catastrophic impact of natural 
hazards on CIs, with consequences ranging from health impacts and environmental 
degradation to major economic losses, with a major role of cascading effects on risk. 
STREST developed innovative hazard models to include in stress tests of CIs to 
tackle the problem of extreme events, with focus on earthquakes, floods (tsunamis, 
dam failures) and domino effects (Natech, system failures). Earthquake models 
considered epistemic uncertainties, earthquake rupture directivity, cascading and 
clustering, spatial correlations, site/geotechnical effects, and permanent ground 
displacement. Inter-hazard interactions included flooding from dam failure, tsunamis due 
to earthquakes, and industrial accidents due to both earthquakes and tsunamis. 
Probabilistic risk models and tools are essential for analysing and quantifying the 
consequences of critical infrastructure damage due to extreme natural events. Yet, they 
are not widely used in risk management of non-nuclear CIs. The project filled this gap by 
producing fragility functions for components of petrochemical plants, dams, harbours, 
gas/oil distribution networks (e.g. storage tanks, cranes, pipelines, hydropower systems) 
and common industrial buildings with respect to earthquakes, floods and tsunamis, and 
demonstrating how these component fragilities can be integrated at the system level. 
The interdependencies within a CI and possible cascading failures may have an 
important impact on the society (public safety and higher-level societal functions) 
beyond the critical infrastructure itself, as observed in past events and demonstrated in 
the STREST exploratory applications. Societal resilience definition, models, probabilistic 
assessment and acceptance criteria remain as yet in the research domain. 
The engineering risk-based multi-level stress test methodology developed by 
STREST enhances the evaluation of the risk exposure of CIs against natural hazards. In 
order to account for the diversity of CIs, the wide range of potential consequences of 
failure, the types of hazards and the available human and financial resources, each 
stress test level is characterised by a different scope (component or system) and by a 
different complexity of the risk analysis. The outcome of stress tests is a grade 
convening where the risk posed is with respect to pre-determined risk acceptance 
criteria. The grading system is based on different hazard and risk metrics and is 
independent of the class of the infrastructure and/or of the underlying hazard and risk 
drivers. 
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A petrochemical plant (IT), a hydropower dam (CH), hydrocarbon pipelines (TK), a gas 
storage and distribution network (NL), a harbour (GR) and an industrial district (IT) were 
selected for exploratory applications of the stress test methodology, which illustrated 
how the developed tools were able to identify extremes and disaggregate risks to 
specific scenarios of hazard and component failures. Furthermore, the method was built 
to support decision-making on cost-effective mitigation measures. 
 
Main findings 
The STREST project produced fundamental knowledge beyond the state-of-the-art in 
hazard, vulnerability, risk and resilience assessment of non-nuclear CIs and systems of 
infrastructures for extreme natural events. The main achievements, some case-
dependent, are: (1) a probabilistic multi-hazard/risk assessment framework including 
cascade scenarios; (2) a harmonised treatment of uncertainties and mechanics of hazard 
assessment; (3) a consistent taxonomy of classes of CIs including intensity measures, 
engineering demand parameters and performance indicators; (4) probabilistic models for 
fragility, vulnerability and consequence assessment; (5) an integrated risk assessment of 
geographically distributed CIs considering interdependencies and cascading effects; (6) 
probabilistic structural and systemic performance models to determine losses; and (7) 
an engineering risk-based multi-level stress test methodology, with workflow and tools. 
 
Related and future JRC work 
The activities of the STREST project are well aligned with the JRC established experience 
and expert capability in assessment of natural and man-made hazards, risk mitigation 
measures, and protection of critical infrastructures. The JRC will continue – within 
institutional and collaborative projects – to provide European policy makers and other 
stakeholders with scientific and technical advice on improving resilience against natural, 
technological and man-made disasters, by performing research, developing tools and 
guidelines, and also through the Disaster Risk Management Knowledge Centre. 
 
Quick guide 
Critical infrastructures are the backbone of modern society and provide many essential 
goods and services, e.g. electrical power, telecommunications, water, etc. As such, they 
have been highly integrated and intertwined. These growing interdependencies make our 
complex evolving society more vulnerable to natural hazards. Recent events, such as the 
2011 Fukushima disaster, have shown that cascading failures of CIs have the potential 
for multi-infrastructure collapse and widespread socioeconomic consequences. 
Moving toward a safer and more resilient society requires improved and standardised 
tools for hazard and risk assessment of low-probability high-consequences events and 
the systematic application of these new tools to whole classes of CIs. Among the most 
important tools are the stress tests, designed to test CI vulnerability. Following the 
stress tests recently performed for the European nuclear power plants, it is urgent to 
carry out appropriate stress tests for all other CI classes. 
The ‘Harmonized approach to stress tests for critical infrastructures against natural 
hazards’ (STREST) project, funded by the European Community’s Seventh Framework 
Programme, designed a new stress test framework for non-nuclear CIs, with the 
development of innovative models for the hazard, risk and resilience assessment of 
extreme events (earthquake, tsunami, flood), and with applications to six CIs 
(www.strest-eu.org). The results of STREST shall enable the implementation of European 
Union policies for the systematic enactment of societal risk governance. 
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1. Introduction 
Critical infrastructures (CIs) are the backbone of modern society and provide many 
essential goods and services, e.g. electrical power, telecommunications, water, etc. As 
so, they have been highly integrated and intertwined. These growing interdependencies 
make our complex evolving society more vulnerable to natural hazards. Recent events, 
such as the 2011 Fukushima disaster, have shown that cascading failures of CIs have 
the potential for multi-infrastructure collapse and widespread socioeconomic 
consequences. Moving toward a safer and more resilient society requires i) improved and 
standardised tools for hazard and risk assessment, in particular for low-probability high-
consequences events (so-called extreme events), and ii) a systematic application of 
these new procedures to whole classes of CIs. Among the most important tools are the 
stress tests, designed to test the vulnerability and resilience of CIs to extreme 
conditions. Following the stress tests recently performed for the European nuclear power 
plants, it is urgent to carry out appropriate stress tests for all other CI classes. 
The ‘Harmonized approach to stress tests for critical infrastructures against natural 
hazards’ (STREST) project (www.strest-eu.org), funded by the European Community’s 
Seventh Framework Programme, designed an innovative stress test framework for non-
nuclear CIs, with the development of models for the hazard, risk and resilience 
assessment of extreme events, and with applications to six specific CIs. The results of 
STREST shall enable the implementation of new European policies for the systematic 
enactment of stress tests. 
Focusing on earthquakes, tsunamis, geotechnical effects, floods and various domino 
effects, STREST tackled the following themes: 
i) Lessons learned from past regulations and research projects (Tsionis et al 
2016); 
ii) Hazard assessment of extreme events (Cotton et al 2016); 
iii) Vulnerability of CIs and their performance to extreme events (Iervolino et al 
2016); and 
iv) Development of the STREST stress test methodology and framework 
(Stojadinović et al 2016). 
The proposed methods were integrated in exploratory applications on six representative 
CIs (Pitilakis et al 2016): 
i) Petrochemical plant in Milazzo, Italy (A1); 
ii) Hydropower dam of the Valais region, Switzerland (A2); 
iii) Hydrocarbon pipelines, Turkey (B1); 
iv) National gas storage and distribution network, Netherlands (B2); 
v) Port infrastructure of Thessaloniki, Greece (B3); and 
vi) Industrial district in Tuscany, Italy (C1). 
Those CIs were categorised into three classes in the early phase of the project: (A) 
individual, single-site infrastructures with high risk and potential for high local impact 
and regional or global consequences; (B) distributed and/or geographically-extended 
infrastructures with potentially high economic and environmental impact; and (C) 
distributed, multiple-site infrastructures with low individual impact but large collective 
impact or dependencies. While the project concluded that such a classification was not 
necessary to apply the proposed stress test methodology, classes A-B-C are kept in this 
report for sake of clarity. 
This report is the final part of a set of six Reference Reports that provide guidelines 
covering all the steps for a coherent hazard/risk assessment and stress test design 
together with the reports on the implementation on the six test sites (Tsionis et al 2016, 
Introduction 
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Cotton et al 2016, Iervolino et al 2016, Stojadinović et al 2016, Pitilakis et al 2016). It is 
a policy brief, addressed mainly to owners and operators of CIs, regulators and other 
national and European authorities, as well as Civil Protection departments. It describes 
the policy context, state-of-the-art in stress tests and the objectives of the STREST 
project (Chapter 2), the key research results and findings from the exploratory 
applications (Chapter 3) and the impact of the project on the implementation of 
European policies for risk reduction and protection of CIs, the production and exchange 
of knowledge and the public acceptance of CIs (Chapter 4). Lastly, a number of short- 
and mid-term recommendations for the implementation of stress test policies are 
proposed (Chapter 5). The participating institutions and associated industry partners are 
listed in Annex A. 
Why STREST 
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2. Why STREST 
2.1 Policy objectives for critical infrastructures 
The European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection1 adopts an all-hazards 
approach with the general objective to improve the protection of CIs in the European 
Union. The planned actions include the collection of best practices, risk assessment tools 
and methodologies, studies concerning interdependencies, identification and reduction of 
vulnerabilities. Besides, increasing Europe’s resilience to natural and man-made 
disasters is among the strategic objectives of the Internal Security Strategy2, which asks 
for the development of guidelines for all-hazards disaster management and the 
establishment of a risk management policy. 
In this perspective, the Directive on the identification and designation of European 
critical infrastructures3 aims to improve these infrastructures to better protect the safety, 
and fulfil the needs, of citizens. For each European CI, an operator security plan must be 
put in place and reviewed regularly. Member States are to report every two years on the 
risks, threats and vulnerabilities the different European CI sectors are facing. 
The ‘Seveso’ Directive4, on the other hand, lays down rules for the prevention of 
accidents involving dangerous substances and the limitation of their consequences for 
human health and the environment. Operators are requested to produce and regularly 
update safety reports, which include, inter alia, the identification and analysis of risks, as 
well as measures to limit the consequences of a major accident. 
Aiming at the reduction of the adverse consequences for human health, the 
environment, cultural heritage and economic activity associated with floods, the Floods 
Directive5 requires the development of flood hazard and risk maps and of risk 
management plans. 
Lastly, the Union Civil Protection Mechanism6 aims to improve the effectiveness of 
systems for preventing, preparing for and responding to natural and man-made 
disasters. The specific common objectives are to: i) achieve a high level of protection 
against all kinds of natural and man-made disasters; ii) enhance preparedness to 
respond to disasters; iii) facilitate rapid and efficient response; and iv) increase public 
awareness and preparedness for disasters. 
At the global level, the substantial reduction of disaster damage to CIs and disruption of 
basic services is one the seven targets of the Sendai Framework for disaster risk 
reduction (UNISDR 2015). Besides, the STREST project contributes to the development 
of sustainable and resilient infrastructures, both regional and transnational, which is a 
                                           
1 Communication from the Commission on a European programme for critical 
infrastructure protection. COM(2006) 786 final 
2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The 
EU internal security strategy in action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe. 
COM(2010) 673 final 
3 Council Directive 2008/114/EC on the identification and designation of European critical 
infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection 
4 Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the control of 
major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances 
5 Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the assessment 
and management of flood risks 
6 Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
December 2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism 
Why STREST 
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specific target of the UN Sustainable Development7 Goal 9 ‘Build resilient infrastructure, 
promote sustainable industrialization and foster innovation’. 
2.2 The need for stress tests and new knowledge 
CIs are vulnerable to natural hazards. Retrospective analyses of selected major industrial 
accident databases showed that 2 to 5 % of reported accidents with hazardous materials 
releases, fires or explosions were caused by natural hazards. More specifically, these 
analyses identified 79 records of accidents triggered by earthquakes in the 1930-2007 
period and 272 records of accidents triggered by flooding in the 1960-2007 period 
(Cozzani et al 2010, Krausmann et al 2011). 
Modern strategies to reduce vulnerabilities and increase the resilience, adaptive capacity 
and efficiency of CIs – as well as the provision of related analytical instruments – have to 
follow an integrative approach. However, CIs are usually engineered and operated in an 
isolated manner and insufficient attention has been devoted to the interdependencies 
between them, as well as to the interplay with their social and economic environment. 
Therefore, little is known about how to model and eventually improve their resilience. 
This requires a profound systemic understanding of the intertwined infrastructures and 
their collective performance. 
Moving toward a safer and more resilient society requires improved and standardised 
tools for hazard and risk assessment of low probability-high consequence (so-called 
extreme) events, and their systematic application to whole classes of CIs, targeting 
integrated risk mitigation strategies. 
Previous research projects and studies advanced the knowledge in seismic, tsunami, 
permanent ground displacement, induced seismicity and flood hazard assessment, 
considering concatenated events and geographically extended areas. The STREST project 
targeted specific knowledge gaps identified in recent disciplinary hazard studies with the 
goal of harmonising hazard assessment conducted at different scales (local and regional) 
and for different natural hazards initiators, including potential extreme events. 
The vulnerability and risk assessment within the framework of performance-based 
earthquake engineering has received a great deal of research attention in recent years, 
especially for buildings. STREST addressed the need to develop vulnerability and loss 
models for CIs considering multiple hazards and cascading effects. 
An engineering risk-based multi-level stress test methodology for non-nuclear CIs was 
developed by STREST. In order to account for the diversity of CIs, the wide range of 
potential consequences of failure, the types of hazards and the available human and 
financial resources, each stress test level is characterised by a different scope 
(component or system) and by a different complexity of the risk analysis. The outcome 
of a critical infrastructure stress test is a grade convening where the risk posed by the 
critical infrastructure is with respect to pre-determined risk acceptance criteria. 
Concerning resilience, fundamental research is needed to include it in stress tests for 
CIs. STREST developed a conceptual framework to address the resilience of 
infrastructures, defined quantitative resilience metrics and proposed a method to assess 
them. 
At the European level, the state-of-the-art for stress tests is defined by the post-
Fukushima stress tests for nuclear power plants and by the Seveso Directive for major-
accident hazards involving dangerous substances. The STREST project advances the 
state-of-the-art by proposing a multi-level stress test methodology and framework, built 
on a harmonised approach to hazard and vulnerability assessment and quantification. 
                                           
7 www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment 
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2.3 Objectives of the STREST project 
The consistent design of stress tests and their application to specific infrastructures, to 
classes of infrastructures as well as to whole systems of interconnected infrastructures, 
is a first step required to verify the safety and resilience of individual components as well 
as of whole systems. Obtaining such knowledge by carrying out appropriate stress tests 
for all classes of CIs is a clear goal and urgent need for Europe. 
STREST followed five overarching objectives, to improve the state of knowledge and to 
provide the basis for future European Union policies for the systematic implementation of 
stress tests for non-nuclear CIs. The STREST objectives were to: 
1. Establish a common and consistent taxonomy of CIs, their risk profiles and their 
interdependencies, with respect to the resilience to natural hazard events; 
2. Develop a rigorous common methodology and a consistent modelling approach to 
hazard, vulnerability, risk and resilience assessment of low-probability high-
consequence (i.e., extreme) events used to define stress tests; 
3. Design a stress test methodology and framework, including a grading system (A – 
pass to C – fail), and apply it to assess the vulnerability and resilience of 
individual CIs as well as to address the first level of interdependencies among 
critical infrastructures from local and regional perspectives; 
4. Work with key European CIs to apply and test the developed stress test 
framework and models to specific real infrastructures chosen to typify general 
classes of CIs; 
5. Develop standardised protocols and operational guidelines for stress tests, 
disseminate the findings of STREST, and facilitate their implementation in 
practice. 
Progress beyond the state-of-the-art and key research findings 
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3. Progress beyond the state-of-the-art and key research 
findings 
The STREST project produced fundamental knowledge beyond the state-of-the-art in 
hazard, vulnerability, risk and resilience assessment of non-nuclear CIs and systems of 
infrastructures for low-probability and high-consequence natural hazards. The main 
achievements are summarised below and described in more detail in the following 
sections: 
o Multi-hazard/risk framework for generating probabilistic hazard and/or risk 
scenarios, which properly accounts for cascading events; 
o Harmonised treatment of uncertainties and mechanics of hazard assessment; 
o Consistent taxonomy of classes of CIs, including intensity measures, engineering 
demand parameters and performance indicators; 
o Probabilistic models for fragility, vulnerability and consequence assessment of CIs, 
including geographically distributed ones; 
o Integrated risk of geographically distributed infrastructures considering cascading 
effects and interdependencies; 
o Probabilistic structural and systemic performance models to determine CI losses; 
o An engineering risk-based multi-level stress test methodology, with workflow and 
tools. 
3.1 Background 
Several measures that are implemented in nuclear facilities may be used in non-nuclear 
CIs, such as bunkered systems, ‘dry site’ concept for the plant layout against flooding, 
seismic monitoring and tsunami warning systems coupled with provisions for operator 
action. Besides, state-of-the-art guidelines are available and provide qualitative, semi-
quantitative and quantitative concepts for risk assessment. Regarding earthquakes in 
particular, seismic hazard is defined in the national annexes to Eurocode 8 (CEN 2004), 
while the SHARE project (Woessner et al 2015) represents the most recent approach on 
the seismic hazard harmonisation in Europe. 
Recent events have highlighted the potential for catastrophic impact of natural hazards 
on CIs, with consequences ranging from health impacts and environmental degradation 
to major economic losses due to damage to assets and business interruption. For major 
earthquakes, floods and tsunamis, there is a high risk of multiple and simultaneous 
impacts at a single infrastructure or to several infrastructures over a potentially large 
area. The review of recent events also highlighted the major risk of cascading effects, 
such as the release and dispersion of flammable substances and the reduction of 
production due to impacts at suppliers of raw materials or because products cannot be 
delivered where major transport hubs are affected by the disaster. 
3.2 Low-probability high-consequence hazard assessment 
Extreme events can be considered as the consequence of three different processes 
(Mignan et al 2017): (i) they can emerge naturally from randomness - those are events 
that occur by ’lack of chance’ and populate the tail of statistical distributions; (ii) 
extremes can be due to physical processes that amplify their severity, for example 
domino effects; (iii) they finally can be due to site-specific conditions that again amplify 
severity locally. These three general processes, which can be intertwined, have been 
considered in STREST by investigating the themes described in the following. 
Progress beyond the state-of-the-art and key research findings 
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A coherent process was developed to ensure a robust management of epistemic 
uncertainty within a stress test (so-called EU@STREST; Marzocchi et al 2015, Selva et al 
2016). The process ensures a standardised and robust treatment of the epistemic 
uncertainty emerging from hazardous phenomena selection, alternative models 
implementation and exploration of the tails of distributions. It takes into account the 
diverse range of views and expert opinions, the budget limitations and the regulatory 
impact. This process allows a rigorous and meaningful validation of any probabilistic 
hazard analysis and provides a clear description of epistemic uncertainty. Although 
developed and tested for seismic and tsunami hazard assessment, the method is easily 
portable to other perils. 
Seismic hazard measures and extreme event scenarios for geographically extended 
lifeline systems were defined (Akkar and Cheng 2016). Multi-scale random fields and 
Monte Carlo simulation techniques were implemented for computing the annual 
exceedance rates of dynamic ground-motion intensity measures as well as permanent 
fault displacement. The developed techniques allow considering a number of 
seismological factors, which are important for a proper hazard assessment of 
geographically extended CIs in a computationally efficient way. 
The stochastic dependence among the processes counting multiple exceedances of 
intensity measures was also studied for geographically extended structures (Giorgio and 
Iervolino 2016). Closed-form solutions for multi-site probabilistic seismic hazard analysis 
were developed and probabilistically rigorous insights into the form of dependence 
among hazards at multiple sites were derived. 
Several approaches are available for site-specific probabilistic seismic hazard 
assessment, including the use of proxies, e.g. Vs30, in ground motion prediction 
equations, proxies and amplifications factors, linear site-specific residual, instrumental 
linear site response analysis and numerical linear or nonlinear response analysis. The 
variability of the results from these approaches was reviewed and illustrated on the 
Euroseistest site in Greece (http://euroseisdb.civil.auth.gr). The results of the 
application were then used to formulate recommendations for an ‘optimal’ approach 
depending on the available information (Aristizábal et al 2016). A systematic comparison 
of site specific and non-specific hazard assessment has also been performed for 80 sites 
in Europe (Kotha et al 2016a, 2016b). Differences as large as 50 % are observed. 
Near-source ground motions can carry seismic demand systematically larger than that of 
so-called ordinary records, due to phenomena such as rupture forward directivity. A 
framework for considering forward directivity in structural design was developed, as 
schematically represented in Fig. 3.1. The displacement coefficient method was 
implemented for estimating near-source seismic demand, by making use of the results of 
near-source probabilistic hazard analysis and a semi-empirical equation for near-source 
forward directivity inelastic displacement ratio (Baltzopoulos et al 2015). 
 
Fig. 3.1  Schematic representation of site-source configuration (Iervolino 2015) 
Progress beyond the state-of-the-art and key research findings 
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Probabilistic multi-hazard scenarios were generated for three different cases, 
emphasizing the richness of processes potentially leading to extremes (see also Mignan 
et al 2016a): 
(i) ‘Intra-event’ earthquake triggering, based on concepts of dynamic stress, allowed 
evaluating the maximum magnitude Mmax of cascading fault ruptures (Mignan et 
al 2015). Once fault rupture cascading is considered, as observed in Nature, 
higher Mmax values follow (see Fig. 3.2 for the Anatolian region), which may 
have an impact on pipeline stress tests for instance. 
(ii) ‘Intra-hazard’ earthquake triggering, based on the theory of Coulomb stress 
transfer, allowed evaluating earthquake spatiotemporal clustering and its role in 
damage-dependent vulnerability (Mignan et al 2016b) (see consequences at the 
risk level in section 3.3). 
(iii) ‘Inter-hazard’ interactions were considered at hydropower dams to examine the 
combined impact of earthquakes, floods, internal erosion, malfunctions on the 
dam and foundation, spillway, etc. 
The characteristics of the cascades were investigated under various parametric 
conditions with a view to discussing their possible inclusion in stress tests (Matos et al 
2015) (see also section 3.5.1). All hazard interactions were modelled using the Generic 
Multi-Risk (GenMR) framework described in Mignan et al (2014). 
 
 
Fig. 3.2  Mmax maps of the strike-slip faults in the Anatolian region: recomputed from the 
SHARE fault database (top) and with rupture propagation across segments (bottom) 
(Mignan et al 2015) 
A site-specific tsunami hazard assessment method was developed for inclusion in stress 
tests (Selva et al 2016). It makes use of an event tree and performs a separate 
treatment of subduction and background (crustal) earthquakes, which allows for a more 
focused use of available information and for avoiding significant biases. For the 
application in the Thessaloniki area, full simulations have been conducted at the regional 
Progress beyond the state-of-the-art and key research findings 
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scale using the complete event tree. Example results of tsunami inundation modelling 
are shown in Fig. 3.3. 
 
Fig. 3.3 Site-specific tsunami inundation modelling results on a high-resolution grid of 
the application in the port of Thessaloniki (Selva et al 2016; Pitilakis et al 2016) 
3.3 Vulnerability models for stress tests of critical 
infrastructures 
Regarding single-site CIs, standardised procedures were developed for the hazard 
assessment and consequence analysis of petrochemical plants (Salzano et al 2015), 
dams (Matos et al 2015) and harbours (Pitilakis 2015). Structural vulnerability functions 
for all elements at risk (such as storage tanks and pipelines; foundation, spillway and 
hydropower system in dams; and buildings and cranes in harbours) were defined with 
respect to earthquakes, tsunamis and floods. Indicative examples are shown in Fig. 3.4. 
  
(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
Fig. 3.4  Fragility functions for (a) warehouses, (b) cranes (Karafagka et al 2016) and (c) 
atmospheric tanks (Salzano, 2015) for tsunami hazard and (d) structural and non-
structural components of industrial buildings for earthquake hazard (Crowley 2015) 
warehouse
crane
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Similarly, tools (e.g., fragility curves, response and vulnerability analysis models) and 
specifications were provided for the three geographically distributed CIs (Miraglia et al 
2015, Uckan et al 2015, Trevlopoulos and Guéguen 2016). The interdependencies in the 
port of Thessaloniki were investigated, with the aim to develop a conceptual framework 
on factors influencing the resilience of geographically distributed CIs and to define stress 
tests at a regional scale that account for the consequences of cascading failures. 
Industrial districts have been selected as an example of multiple-site, low-risk high-
impact CIs. Precast concrete warehouses and other industrial buildings that are typically 
found in industrial districts in Europe, and that have demonstrated high levels of damage 
in past earthquakes, were used as an application of the guidelines for developing a 
probabilistic risk model that includes fragility functions for structural and non-structural 
components and contents, and modelling the consequences of damage with a focus on 
monetary losses (Babič and Dolšek 2014, Casotto et al 2015). 
Finally, structural methods for probabilistic performance assessment in the case of state-
dependent seismic damage accumulation were developed based on Markov chains 
(Iervolino et al 2016). Damage-dependent vulnerability was also combined to 
earthquake clustering in northern Italy and the impact on risk investigated (Mignan et al 
2016b). Results are shown in Fig. 3.5. In simple terms, risk increases as additional 
physical processes are considered, such as event clustering and dynamic vulnerability. 
 
A
n
n
u
a
l 
e
x
c
e
e
d
in
g
 p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
 
 
  Number of buildings at extensive damage or 
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Fig. 3.5  Seismic risk curves in a conceptual example in northern Italy, with amplification 
of risk due to the combination of earthquake clustering and damage-dependent 
vulnerability of buildings (Mignan et al 2016b) 
3.4 Stress test methodology for non-nuclear critical 
infrastructures 
The engineering risk-based multi-level stress test, ST@STREST (Stojadinović et al 2016, 
Esposito et al 2017), that was developed in the project and applied in the exploratory 
applications, aims to enhance the procedures for evaluation of the risk exposure of non-
nuclear CIs against natural hazards. To account for diverse types of infrastructures, the 
potential consequence of failure, the types of hazards and the available resources for 
conducting the stress test, each stress test level is characterised by a different scope 
(component or system) and by a different complexity of the risk analysis. The workflow 
is presented in Fig. 3.6. 
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Fig. 3.6  Workflow of the ST@STREST methodology and interaction among the main 
actors during the multiple-expert process (Esposito et al 2017) 
In the Pre-Assessment phase (Phase 1), the data available on the CI and hazard are 
collected. Then, the risk measures and objectives, the time frame, the total costs of the 
stress test and the most appropriate stress test level are defined. 
In the Assessment phase (Phase 2), initial design demand levels for each component are 
compared with the best available information about their capacity and then, a systemic 
probabilistic risk analysis of the entire CI is performed (using, for instance, the hazard 
and risk methods developed in STREST for the modelling of extreme events – sections 
3.2-3.3). 
In the Decision phase (Phase 3), results of the Assessment phase are compared to the 
risk objectives defined in the Pre-Assessment phase. This comparison results in a grade 
(Fig. 3.7) that informs about the magnitude of the risk posed by the critical 
infrastructure, and, if the risk is possibly unjustifiable or intolerable, how much the 
safety of the CI should be improved until the next periodical verification. Critical events 
that most likely cause the exceedance of a loss value of interest are identified through a 
disaggregation analysis. Risk mitigation strategies and guidelines are formulated based 
on the identified critical events. 
 
Fig. 3.7  Grading system used in ST@STREST (Esposito et al 2016) 
PM: project manager; TI: technical integrator; 
ET: evaluation team; PoE: pool of experts; 
IR: internal reviewers 
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In the Report Phase (Phase 4), the experts present the stress test results to authorities 
and regulators. The presentation includes the outcome of stress test in terms of the 
grade, the critical trigger events, the guidelines for risk mitigation, and the accuracy of 
the methods adopted in the stress test. 
3.5 Exploratory applications of new stress test concept 
This section provides a brief summary of the results of stress tests performed at the six 
pilot sites considered in the STREST project, separated in three classes A (section 3.5.1), 
B (section 3.5.2) and C (section 3.5.3). For a detailed description of the results, the 
reader is invited to consult Pitilakis et al (2016). Fig. 3.8 combines all the obtained stress 
test grades (Fig. 3.7) for comparison not only of the risk posed by these critical 
infrastructures but also of the stress test levels used in these example applications. Note 
that, while a significant effort was invested to develop the best possible stress test for 
each considered critical infrastructure, the obtained results do not reflect the actual 
safety or risk posed by these critical infrastructures because the data considered in this 
public project was limited for safety or business reasons. 
 
Fig. 3.8  Stress test results in terms of grades by pilot site and level of detail (Pitilakis et 
al 2016). ST-Lxx labels represent the different levels of ST@STREST and CI-xx the site 
classes and numbers 
3.5.1 Individual, single-site infrastructures with high risk and potential 
for high local impact and regional or global consequences 
For a conceptual dam system, it was shown that accounting for component fragility 
functions and epistemic uncertainty affecting hazards, components, and their 
interactions (Matos et al 2015) increased four-fold the frequency of failures (yet 
remaining in the examined case below existing dam safety margins). In order to 
characterise losses in the downstream area, inundation scenarios were generated based 
on a 2-D hydraulic model, capturing the uncertainty in the dam-break wave propagation 
and the probabilistic response of buildings to the flood. Resulting maps, as the one 
shown in Fig. 3.9, can be used to plan which buildings at risk to reinforce, provide with 
shelters, or relocate. 
Progress beyond the state-of-the-art and key research findings 
14  
 
 
Fig. 3.9  Inundation resulting from overtopping of the conceptual-dam application 
(Pitilakis et al 2016, work by EPFL and ETH Zurich) 
Quantitative risk assessment of an oil refinery impacted by earthquakes and tsunamis 
was performed. For this specific site, tsunamis damaged a limited number of 
atmospheric storage vessels along the shoreline, while earthquakes increased the failure 
frequency of atmospheric storage tanks. However, societal risk was mainly caused by 
damage to LPG tanks, which failed due to industrial-related causes, and therefore the 
impact of the natural hazards was limited. Fig. 3.10 presents the probabilistic risk 
contours separately for the three types of hazards examined. 
   
(a) (b) (c) 
Fig. 3.10  Probabilistic risk contours for (a) industrial, (b) tsunami and (c) earthquake 
triggers in the petrochemical plant application (Pitilakis et al 2016, work by AMRA & 
INGV) 
 10-4/year 
 10-5/year 
 10-6/year 
 10-7/year 
 10-8/year 
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3.5.2 Distributed and/or geographically-extended infrastructures with 
potentially high economic and environmental impact 
A stress test of an oil pipeline crossing five faults was performed considering the failure 
at the intersections as perfectly correlated or statistically independent and spotting the 
three most critical intersections to be retrofitted. The calculated maximum tensile and 
compressive strains of the pipe at the five crossings are shown in Fig. 3.11. The 
proposed change of the pipe-fault intersection angle reduced the probability of failure to 
less than 2 % in 2475 years and the overall risk to negligible. 
  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 3.11  Maximum tensile (a) and compressive (b) pipe strains for the pipes at pipe-
fault crossings for to different intersection angles (Pitilakis et al 2016, work by KOERI) 
A stress test for a sub-network of the Groningen field in the Netherlands was performed 
using a risk-based approach for individual stations and pipe segments and a full 
probabilistic risk analysis with Monte Carlo simulations for the network analysis. 
Earthquakes induced by gas extraction were the main hazard source. Fig. 3.12 shows 
low risk of high connectivity loss (i.e. the average reduction in the ability of endpoints to 
receive flow in the damaged network with respect to the original conditions). These 
results were obtained under a number of conservative assumptions for the seismic 
demand and the component fragilities. 
 
Fig. 3.12  Annual probability of exceedance of network connectivity loss (CL) of the 
natural gas distribution network (Pitilakis et al 2016, work by TNO) 
The application to the port facility showed that it might pass, partly pass or fail a stress 
test depending on the seismic scenario, analysis approach (see Fig. 3.13) and risk 
metric. Several electric power distribution substations, which presented high failure risk 
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and contributed significantly to the performance loss of the port due to loss of power 
supply to the cranes, should be considered for upgrading or/and provided with 
alternative power sources. Although the systemic risk for the tsunami hazard was very 
low, it was recommended to investigate the effect of floating ships that may hit the 
harbour components. 
 
 
Fig. 3.13  Functionality of components in the harbour application for an earthquake 
scenario with 475 years return period, for equivalent linear (top) and nonlinear analysis 
approach (bottom) (Pitilakis et al 2016, work by AUTH and INGV) 
3.5.3 Distributed, multiple-site infrastructures with low individual 
impact but large collective impact or dependencies 
The limited budget for a stress test of the industrial district has conditioned the level of 
detail and complexity of the stress test, which considered only seismic hazard as the 
predominant hazard. The results showed that several facilities failed the component level 
assessment and identified the sub-typologies that contributed most to the total average 
annual losses, as illustrated in Fig. 3.14. The event disaggregation implied that business 
interruption losses were not just driven by the rare events, and thus mitigation efforts 
related to structural and non-structural retrofitting should be given high priority. 
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V: vertical precast panels 
H: horizontal panels 
M: concrete masonry infills 
1: long saddle roof beams, 
 built before 1996 
2: short rectangular beams, 
 built before 1996 
3: built after 1996 
Fig. 3.14  Disaggregation of average annual loss in the industrial district application, 
according to building sub-class for each component of loss (Pitilakis et al 2016, work by 
EUCENTRE and UL) 
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4. Policy impact of STREST 
STREST seeks to improve the security and resilience of CIs against low-probability high-
consequence natural hazards. The fundamental knowledge, methodologies and tools 
produced by the project provide the basis for a master plan for the coordinated 
implementation of stress tests for whole classes of CIs and systems thereof. The long-
term impacts originating from the project, which will outlast its duration and ensure a 
structuring effect in Europe, refer to the reinforced European safety assessment 
capacity, improved and more reliable stress tests for CIs, support for decision making 
and prioritisation of mitigation options and support for preparedness, all leading to 
increased societal resilience. 
STREST provides best practices and robust methodologies for stress tests, in particular 
for the systematic identification of major hazards and potential extremes, infrastructure 
vulnerabilities and interdependencies, and systematic technology-neutral risk-based 
stress test workflow, in support of the implementation of the European policies for 
disaster risk reduction and the protection of national and European CIs. Furthermore, the 
correct assessment of risk is a pre-requisite of any long-term strategy for industrial and 
energy production in Europe. In a wider context, the results produced in STREST 
contribute to the faster attainment of the Sendai Framework target for reducing disaster 
damage to CIs. 
The knowledge, procedures and tools developed by the project are useful on one hand 
for owners and operators of CIs to optimise CI maintenance and/or partial or complete 
replacement, develop the operator security plan and draft the regular reports on risks 
and vulnerability, and on the other hand for Member States authorities and 
urban/community planners to develop and update their national risk assessments, with 
the ultimate goal of increasing the resilience of CIs and societies to the effects of 
extreme events. 
The networking with key organisations and programs in the USA, Asia and Japan ensures 
the international perspective, harmonisation and knowledge transfer for the development 
of truly novel standards. In addition, clustering activities with previous and on-going 
projects (SHARE, SYNER-G, MATRIX, INFRARISK, RAIN, INTACT) on related issues gives 
added value to the European framework programme for research by defining a common 
understanding of terminology, sharing of good practice and harmonising indicators, 
metrics and methods. Furthermore, STREST benefits from the direct participation of 
representatives of a broad range of CIs and industry to ensure the relevance of the 
products and outcomes, and the communication to the wider community. 
STREST conceived a dissemination plan to transform the results and new methodologies 
developed by the project in protocols and reference guidelines for the wider application 
of stress tests. The planned activities are a key instrument for dissemination to the 
scientific and technical communities, as well as to policy and decision makers at 
European, national, regional and local levels. Overall, these activities will have an impact 
on the society at large, by incorporating stress test methodologies in current 
management and long-term planning of non-nuclear CIs, and ultimately by the 
enhancement of societal resilience. 
Public acceptance of existing and new technologies in CIs has been eroded by a number 
of technical accidents and failures initiated by natural events. The coherent assessment 
of risk and safety enabled by the implementation of the STREST methodology and 
framework will allow increasing public acceptance for critical technologies and 
infrastructures, whereas the test applications illustrate the benefits of improved hazard 
and risk assessment for key critical sites in Europe. Moreover, the sensitivity analyses 
conducted on advanced hazard studies combining regional and site-specific assessments 
will enable to develop guidelines for improved surveillance capacity at CI sites and for 
future CI design and construction plans as well. 
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5. Recommendations for the implementation of stress test 
policies 
STREST developed a harmonised multi-hazard and risk process for stress tests and 
advanced the state-of-the-art in hazard and vulnerability assessment of non-nuclear CIs 
against low-probability high-consequence natural events (and implicitly against the more 
common events). It is recommended to: 
1) Promote the application of the methodology (Section 3.4), taking benefit of the 
exploratory applications on six CIs. 
2) Initiate a dialogue (possibly via workshops) between European critical 
infrastructure operators, regulators and users to establish, where needed, and 
harmonize the societal risk tolerance objectives. Indeed, a key issue that 
emerged from the exploratory applications is the fact that a critical infrastructure 
may pass or fail a stress test, depending on the adopted risk targets. 
3) Initiate the drafting of guidelines for the application of harmonised stress tests, 
making use of the knowledge base and tools developed within STREST. 
4) Include uncertainties, cascade effects and multiple hazards in stress tests. 
5) Investigate technical aspects relevant to risk assessment of critical 
infrastructures. 
6) Continue coordination among research projects to capitalise on the wealth of 
knowledge produced within the European Union’s Framework Programme for 
Research and Innovation, for instance through the harmonisation of 
methodologies and exploratory applications in different sites. 
7) Promote transnational cooperation and the wider involvement of stakeholders, 
mainly operators and regulators of critical infrastructures. 
The guidelines provide the best practices and methodologies, together with new scientific 
developments, for hazard and risk assessment. They will ultimately contribute to the 
objectives of the European policies for increased resilience of CIs and of the Sendai 
Framework for the reduction of disaster damage. 
The work performed within STREST highlighted a number of technical aspects relevant to 
hazard and vulnerability assessment of critical infrastructures that should be further 
developed in future studies. Firstly, uncertainties, cascade effects and multiple hazards 
were shown to be important aspects that need to be properly included in stress tests. 
The exploratory applications revealed in some cases lack of input data to perform the 
stress tests and lack of loss data for the calibration of models, e.g. for loss of life 
following damage to critical infrastructures. Regarding vulnerability assessment, fragility 
curves need to be developed for loss of containment in components of petrochemical 
plants, for dam components and systems, for pipelines in case of liquefaction and to 
include the effect of cumulative damage. With a view to the life-cycle management and 
planning of interventions in critical infrastructures, it is advisable to account for the long-
term degradation of components. Lastly, it is recommended to use high-level, validated 
and preferably open-source software to perform the calculations needed for stress tests. 
STREST established technical dialogue with relevant ongoing FP7 and H2020 projects 
and identified areas where common work would be beneficial. These include a common 
approach to uncertainty estimation, review of good practice in risk analysis, and 
harmonisation of hazard indicators and risk metrics. The interaction is planned to 
continue through the participation to different project meetings and if possible in future 
projects. A coordinated support action from the European Commission would be needed 
to capitalise on the wealth of knowledge and tools produced within the EU Framework 
Programme for Research and Innovation. This would allow achieving results at inter-
project level, for instance a harmonised taxonomy across projects and types of CIs (e.g. 
combining energy and transportation networks), a common method for cascade 
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modelling (e.g. applied to both geological and hydrological hazards and industrial risks), 
and a harmonized set of risk tolerance objectives applicable across the range of critical 
infrastructure types and across Europe. 
A panel of experts could help making sure that the methods developed in different 
projects are compatible and investigate whether they can be transposed to additional 
exploratory applications in different sites. Moreover, the panel could investigate the 
causes of possible discrepancies between the results of different projects, with a view to 
harmonised stress test methods. 
Further actions to promote transnational cooperation and the wider involvement of 
stakeholders, mainly operators and regulators of CIs, in all stages of the development 
and implementation of stress tests should be undertaken. Such actions should present 
how the state-of-the-art tools that were produced by STREST and other recent and on-
going research projects may be used to provide scientific evidence for decision-makers 
to achieve a higher level of protection against the effects of extreme natural hazards, to 
communicate risk and mitigation measures to authorities and the general public, and to 
comply with the legal requirements. Through their participation, stakeholders will have 
the opportunity to provide feedback on their needs and experience, and thus contribute 
to the development of guidelines. Their cooperation is also valuable for the collection of 
input data and the definition of common risk levels. STREST has already identified a 
number of European associations of CI operators. 
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A The consortium 
Twelve institutions were involved in the STREST project (see Fig. A.1): 
o Eidgenossische Technische Hochschule Zurich – ETH Zurich, Switzerland; 
o Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne – EPFL, Switzerland; 
o Basler & Hofmann, Consulting Engineers, Zurich, Switzerland; 
o European Centre for Training and Research in Earthquake Engineering – 
EUCENTRE, Italy; 
o Analisi e Monitoraggio del Rischio Ambientale – AMRA, Italy; 
o Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia – INGV, Italy; 
o Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek – TNO, Netherlands; 
o Institut des Sciences de la Terre, Université Joseph Fourier– ISTerre, UJF, France; 
o Aristotle University of Thessaloniki- AUTH, Greece; 
o Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Research Institute – KOERI, Turkey; 
o Ljubljana University, Slovenia; 
o Joint Research Centre – JRC, Belgium. 
 
Fig. A.1  STREST participants 
The Board of Associated Industry Partners was formed of a representative of each of the 
six critical infrastructures considered in the project: 
o CNR and AMRA, risk consultants for the ENI/Kuwait Milazzo petrochemical plant, 
Italy; 
o The Swiss Federal Office of Energy, regulator for the Valais dams of Switzerland; 
o BOTAS International Ltd., operator of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline, 
Turkey; 
o Gasunie Transport Services, owner of the national natural gas pipeline system, 
the Netherlands; 
o Thessaloniki Port Authority SA, Greece; 
o Tuscany Region, Italy. 
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B Reference Reports and technical deliverables 
B.1 Reference Reports 
STREST produced an integrated set of Reference Reports with technical guidelines and 
recommendations concerning the assessment and protection of critical infrastructures, 
written specifically for end-users, regulators and plant operators. This set includes the 
following Reference Reports that are available to download from the project web site 
(www.strest-eu.org): 
RR-1: State-of-the-art and lessons learned from advanced safety studies and stress-
tests for CIs 
RR-2: Guidelines for harmonized hazard assessment for LP-HC events 
RR-3: Guidelines for harmonized vulnerability and risk assessment for CIs 
RR-4: Guidelines for stress-test design for non-nuclear critical infrastructures and 
systems: Methodology 
RR-5: Guidelines for stress-test design for non-nuclear critical infrastructures and 
systems: Applications 
RR-6: STREST project policy brief 
B.2 Technical deliverables 
The scientific output of the project is described in the technical deliverables listed below. 
The deliverables are available to download from the project web site. 
D2.1: Report summarizing the analysis and systematic classification of the results from 
hazard assessment and stress tests for NPPs 
D2.2: Report on state-of-the-art in hazard assessment and stress tests for non-nuclear 
CIs 
D2.3: Report on lessons learned from recent catastrophic events 
D2.4: Report on lessons learned from on-going and completed EU projects 
D3.1: Report on the effects of epistemic uncertainties on the definition of LP-HC events 
D3.2: Report on the definition of extreme hazard scenarios for geographically-extended 
facilities 
D3.3: Report on near-source hazard assessment and definition of reference scenarios for 
stress tests 
D3.4: Guidelines and case studies of site monitoring to reduce the uncertainties affecting 
site-specific earthquake hazard assessment 
D3.5: Report on cascading events and multi-hazard probabilistic hazard scenarios 
D3.6: New software package incorporating induced seismicity hazard in PSHA 
D3.7: Integrated report on the comparative analysis and sensitivity tests of multi-hazard 
assessment of LP-HC events for the six selected application areas 
D4.1: Guidelines for performance and consequences assessment of single-site, high-risk, 
non-nuclear critical infrastructures exposed to multiple natural hazards 
D4.2: Guidelines for performance and consequences assessment of geographically 
distributed, non-nuclear critical infrastructures exposed to multiple natural 
hazards 
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D4.3: Guidelines for performance and consequences assessment of multiple-site, low-
risk, high-impact, non-nuclear critical infrastructures exposed to multiple natural 
hazards 
D4.4: Report on the proposed taxonomy of CIs based on their vulnerability 
characteristics and exposure to natural hazard initiating events 
D4.5: Report on development of a coherent definition of societal resilience and its 
attributes 
D5.1: Report on the proposed engineering risk assessment methodology for stress tests 
of non-nuclear CIs 
D5.2: Report on the proposed Bayesian network framework for conducting stress tests of 
non-nuclear CIs 
D5.3: Tools and strategies to incorporate stress tests into the long-term planning and life 
cycle management of non-nuclear CIs 
D5.4: Report on strategies for stress test implementation at community level and 
strategies to enhance societal resilience using stress tests 
D6.1: Integrated report detailing analyses, results and proposed hierarchical set of 
stress tests for the six CIs covered in STREST 
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